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ABSTRACT 
This study estimates and compares the retention rates of the various recruitment programs 
for the Navy’s Medical Corps officers.  The study is designed to analyze whether current 
accession plans yield adequate retention rates to maintain the long-term viability of the 
Medical Corps.  The data included 3,568 Medical Corps officers who accessed into the 
Navy between 1996 and 2006.  For the purposes of this study, retention is defined as an 
officer staying one year past their initial minimum service obligation.  Our results 
indicate that medical officers accessed via the Uniformed Services University of the 
Health Sciences and Direct Accession programs have higher retention rates compared to 
officers from the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship programs.  These results 
hold true for female, male, and minority Medical Corps officers.  Further research is 
recommended to fully quantify the cost of each accession program and their benefits on 
long- and short-term retention. 
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 Navy Medical Corps (MC) retention and accession planning has been extensively 
researched.  This study will further that research by exploring the costs associated with 
each MC accession program.  Recruiting physicians is just as costly, if not more costly, to 
the Navy as retaining those physicians.  It is important to evaluate the cost per accession.  
The Navy recruits medical students, residents and fellows, licensed physicians, and board 
certified specialists.  This study will compare the retention rates and costs associated with 
recruiting these individuals, and will evaluate which program would be more effective at 
capturing the talent that the Navy needs to meet its health care mission.  Policy analysts 
revisit this problem periodically.  Given the stress from a protracted war, coupled with a 
dismal economy, it is just as important now as ever to revisit these policy issues. 
 Retention is one of the most important aspects of workforce planning.  Navy 
career planning offices, in conjunction with community managers, forecast the Navy’s 
projected loss rate, or attrition rates, by community.  They balance the needs of that 
community against what the projected accessions are so that each community is optimally 
manned.  The Navy builds its accession plans and policies based on these forecasts and 
needs.  Finding and retaining the appropriate personnel is challenging. 
 Navy Medicine is comprised of four corps:  Navy MC, Dental Corps, Nurse 
Corps, and Medical Service Corps.  This research will only concentrate on the Navy MC. 
Medical professionals are in high demand and, as a result, the Navy is 
experiencing shortfalls in certain communities.  This research will build upon the 
recommendations from the General Accounting Office (GAO) report, Military 
Personnel:  Status of Accession, Retention, and End Strength for Military Medical 
Officers and Preliminary Observations Regarding Accession and Retention Challenges.  
In addition this research will use the recommendations from the GAO report to develop 
the regression models used in this study.  In 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
requested that the Comptroller General conduct an assessment of the medical personnel 
requirements of the Department of Defense (DoD).  This report accompanied the 
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, and it provided the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy with a broad overview on the status 
of the entire Navy Medicine enterprise.1 
 The desired outcomes are to have the correct number of people accessed based 
upon recruitment goals, and to ensure that the MC community is adequately manned 
based on the number of authorized billets and end-strength requirements.  This is the 
Navy MC’s vision statement: 
NAVY MEDICINE VISION: 
The United States Navy Medical Department will remain an agile, flexible, 
professionally anchored organization with the ability to execute Force Health 
Protection and all other aspects of expeditionary medical operations to support 
our Navy-Marine Corps warriors in any conflict, humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief, or other operations in which medical is needed for sustainment and success.  
We will prevent injury and illness when possible, and always be capable of 
service to mitigate whatever adversary, ailment, illness, or malady may affect our 
warriors.  We must be capable of providing powerful assistance as a joint medical 
component with other services, the interagency community, allies and 
international partners, as well as medical non-governmental organizations and 
corporations.  We must be a superbly trained and led team of diverse Sailors and 
civilians, who are grounded in our medical ethos, core values and commitment to 
mission readiness and accomplishment.2 
B. PURPOSE 
 The purpose of this study is to evaluate how effectively the MC community 
recruits physicians.  Retention is an important facet in the manning of the MC, and it has 
a significant impact on the ability to meet the Navy Medicine mission.  The Navy has 
various accession programs aimed at recruiting physicians during different points in their 
civilian training.  This study will analyze the retention rates for each of the Navy’s MC 
accession programs at the physicians’ first stay/leave decision point, otherwise referred to 
as the initial Military Service Obligation (MSO) date or end of obligated service date 
(OSD).  A physician can leave the Navy at this point, and will have gained invaluable 
                                                 
1 General Accounting Office, Military Personnel:  Status of Accession, Retention, and End Strength 
for Military Medical Officers and Preliminary Observations Regarding Accession and Retention 
Challenges, GAO-09-469R (Washington, D.C., April 16, 2009), Briefing to Congressional Committees, 3. 
2 “Navy Medicine Strategic Plan,” Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, last accessed October 13, 
2011, http://www.med.navy.mil. 
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hands-on training and leadership experience.  This study will examine whether or not 
these accession programs are serving their intended purpose, and if they are having a 
positive impact on retention.  This research will also evaluate the life-cycle costs of these 
accession programs, and assess the efficacy of the relevant policies that guide  
decision makers. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The Navy MC recruits physicians at all levels of training.  This research will use 
data from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED); Navy Recruiting Command 
(NRC); and Navy Medicine Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (MPTE).  It 
will compare the retention rates of the various accession sources for both the Active and 
Reserve Component physicians, and the costs associated with each program. 
 A secondary area of research will be to determine if the Navy should revisit its 
recruitment goals and accessions, and potentially reallocate funding.  This research will 
remain focused on accession programs, and long-term community health to ensure that 
Navy Medicine continues to meet its dual mission of combat readiness and  
dependent care. 
The primary research questions are: 
 Does the current accession plan yield adequate retention rates to maintain 
the long-term viability of the Navy’s MC community? 
 Does retention vary by accession source and career path? 
The secondary research questions are: 
 What is the optimal mix of accessions to fill long-term billet 
requirements? 
 Do Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP) 
recipients leave the Navy at a higher rate than Uniformed Services 
University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) graduates, or Navy Active 





 Do Reserve physicians that enter as Direct Commission Officers (DCOs) 
leave the Navy at a higher rate than prior service/Navy Veteran (NAVET) 
physicians? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
 The scope will include:  (1) a review of the Navy’s MC accession and retention 
plans; (2) multivariate model development; (3) end-strength analysis based on long-term 
community goals; and (4) results analysis. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
 This study is organized into six chapters.  Chapter I provides an introduction and 
Chapter II is a literature review that discusses previous research in this field.  Chapter III 
includes a description of the data used in this study, and will provide a presentation of the 
descriptive statistics.  It will also describe the variables used in each of the models.  
Chapter IV will review the details of the models and discuss results associated with  
each one.  Chapter V will include a summary of the results, conclusions, and 
recommendations. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The Navy’s Total Force initiative supports a lifetime of service.  The purpose is to 
seamlessly integrate the Active Component, Reserve Component, and civilian workforce.  
It is imperative that there is a mutually beneficial relationship and respect among these 
entities to support the mission, the sailor, and the overall needs of the Navy.  The Navy 
MC strives to meet this expectation at each level of the planning and requirements 
process. 
 The MC community is tasked with finding recruitment and retention solutions 
that are fiscally responsible and sustainable.  Often times these initiatives are undertaken 
while operating under a constrained budget.  The Navy needs to find the most cost-
effective means of manning its billets.  Navy Medicine will maintain the right workforce 
to deliver medical capabilities across the full range of military operations through the 
appropriate mix of accession, retention, education, and training incentives. 
 The Navy’s MC community strives to remain relevant, knowledgeable, and 
professional through training and continued educational opportunities.  Its strategic plans 
are derived from the Surgeon General’s priorities, and they are focused on fulfilling Navy 
Medicine’s vision for an agile, flexible, ready, and professional medical organization that 
is committed to their mission of Force Health Protection, and patient- and family-
centered care. 
 As a nation, we are faced with a unique set of national security challenges at 
home and abroad.  Objectives, cascading missions and strategies are all integrated to 
create a strategic plan to guide each community within the Navy.  “The Navy must create 
a human capital investment strategy capable of placing the right people with the right 
skills, at the right time and place, and at the best value, to execute its global missions.”3  
                                                 
3 “Navy Human Resources Community Strategic Plan:  2010-2015, May 2010,” BUPERS online, last 
accessed November 2, 2011, http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/officer/Detailing/rlstaffcorps/ 
HR/Documents/HR_Strategic_Plan.pdf. 
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All plans are aligned with the Department of the Navy Human Capital Strategy, the Chief 
of Naval Operation’s Maritime Strategy, and other higher-level guidance. 
 The United States Navy’s strategic priorities are set forth in the Navy’s Total 
Force Vision for the 21st Century (NTF-21) and the Navy Personnel Command’s 2020 
Vision statements.  The Total Force mission defines our workforce and helps execute 
policies and programs to attract, recruit, develop, assign, and retain the best possible 
enlisted, officer, and civilian personnel to best support the organization.  With the 
maximization of our available human resources, our Navy can gain the edge and create 
optimal readiness and improved capability to meet our global objectives.4 
B. OVERVIEW OF ACCESSION, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH 
FOR THE NAVY 
 The costs of medical school and specialty training can create a tipping point, 
where money invested upfront may not be worth the expense when physicians leave the 
Navy at a higher than projected rate.  What it boils down to for policy makers is which is 
more important—short- or long-term retention. 
 Recruitment plans have a significant role in short-term and long-term retention.  It 
is important to evaluate how the MC recruits medical professionals at all levels of civilian 
training.  This study will evaluate if the Navy should consider a shift in funding to an 
accession program that has higher retention rates.  This research will also evaluate life-
cycle costs of these accession programs. 
Navy Recruiting Command’s Mission Statement is: 
Our mission is to recruit the best quality men and women from the diverse 
population of our country to fill the Navy’s ranks and focus on the outcomes by 
(1) Executing best business practices and (2) Maintaining an effective, motivated 
integrated active and reserve recruiting force.5 
                                                 
4 “Navy Human Resources Community Strategic Plan:  2010-2015, May 2010,” BUPERS online, last 
accessed November 2, 2011, http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/officer/Detailing/rlstaffcorps/ 
HR/Documents/HR_Strategic_Plan.pdf. 
5 Navy Recruiting Command, last accessed November 14, 2011, http://www.cnrc.navy.mil/about/ 
about.htm. 
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 Delivering cost-effective services is vital to the Navy’s mission to maintain, train, 
and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression, and 
maintaining freedom of the seas. 
1. Accession Defined 
 An accession is when the Navy recruits a new medical officer into the service.  
This “new accession” status pertains to both the Active and Reserve Components.  
Recruiters are tasked with using financial incentives, programs, and advertising to attract 
potential applicants.  The successful completion of this recruitment process results in an 
“access” for the Navy.  Navy planners set accession goals each fiscal year, based upon 
forecasting models.  The Navy maintains data on the type of accession program that the 
applicant applies to, and this information helps shape short- and long-term accession 
planning. 
There are various programs that an MC applicant can access under.  These 
include: 
 Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP):  
This program creates a pipeline of potential Navy physicians who will 
access onto active duty upon the successful completion of medical school.  
It accounts for more than half of physician accessions. 
o AFHPSP provides 100% tuition assistance, a monthly stipend of 
$2,088, and full reimbursement for any required expenses as a 
medical student. 
o Eligible for a sign-on bonus of $20,000. 
o AFHPSP students may access immediately upon completion of 
medical school, or they may continue with their graduate medical 
education (GME) in residency in a military or a civilian program 
prior to entering active duty. 
o Minimum MSO of three years.  If sponsored for four years, the 
student has an MSO of at least four years. 
 DA Program:  The Active and Reserve Components access fully-trained 
physicians who are licensed and/or board certified in their specialty. 
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o The Reserve component refers to their direct accession program as 
DCO. 
o DAs and DCOs are eligible for various financial incentives. 
o Minimum MSO of three years. 
 Recall:  These are Reserve officers recalled to active duty, usually in 
undermanned specialties.  It is used as a valve to complement student 
programs; however, it has had limited success in the MC. 
o Minimum MSO of three years. 
o May be eligible for financial incentives. 
 USUHS:  Triservice medical school with limited accessions per year.  The 
maximum authorized accessions are typically limited to 51 students, 
which is approximately 15%-20% of the total medical accessions  
each year. 
o Minimum MSO of four years. 
 Health Service Collegiate Program (HSCP)6:  Similar to AFHPSP, this 
program creates a pipeline of potential Navy physicians who will access 
onto active duty upon the successful completion of medical school. 
o Students earn approximately $50,000 per year in salary while in 
medical school. 
o Entitled to all pay and privileges of an active duty service member. 
o Earn time toward retirement. 
o Approximately  $10,000 increased in annual salary upon 
graduation. 
Financial Incentives: 
 Health Professions Loan Repayment Program (HPLRP):  This is a 
loan repayment program that provides student loan debt relief to DA 
applicants.  It is only offered to physicians at the initial accession point. 
 Financial Assistance Program (FAP):  This is an inactive Ready 
Reserve program for physicians in civilian graduate education programs.  
                                                 
6 Pilot program for the MC in FY '08; therefore, not included in this research. 
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Participants are appointed as a commissioned officer in the Naval Reserve 
and enter active duty upon completion of their training. 
o Residents and fellows (GME) receive an annual grant of 
approximately $45,000 during their training (approximately 
$275,000 during their residency). 
o Monthly stipend of approximately $2,088. 
o Minimum MSO of three years.7 
2. What is an Accession Plan? 
 The Navy’s accession plan is defined by validated community accession 
requirements that have been determined from predicted attrition and retention rates.  The 
accession plan is used for the next FY and the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). 
 The FYDP displays, by FY, total DoD resources and force structure information 
for the prior year, current year, budget year, and the following four years (the “out 
years”).  It also includes force structure information for an additional three years beyond 
the four “out years.”  The FYDP is updated twice during the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) cycle.  The first time is in August/September to reflect 
the services’ combined Program Objective Memorandum/Budget Estimate Submission 
(POM/BES), and the second time is in January of the following year, to reflect the budget 
that will be submitted to Congress the following month.  The purpose of the PPBE 
process is to allocate resources within the DoD.  The PPBE is a cyclic process that 
provides the mechanisms for decision making, and provides the opportunity to reexamine 
prior decisions in light of changes in the environment.  This is especially important and 
relevant to managing and planning for Navy accessions.  The accession plan is a 
reflection of available resources and, in particular for this research, personnel. 
 The FYDP is considered an internal DoD working document and is closely held 
within the DoD.  Since the FYDP out year programs reflect internal planning  
 
 
                                                 
7 Navy Healthcare Careers, last accessed November 15, 2011, http://www.navy.com/careers/ 
healthcare/. 
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assumptions, it assists MC planners with identifying target numbers for recruiting and 
accession quotas.  As such, planners can revise the accession plan throughout the 
execution year. 
3. What is a Strength Plan? 
The MC Community Manager will develop officer community strength plans in 
accordance with accession policy plans guidance, and submit annually or as required.  
These reports are reviewed and validated monthly and include the inventory (number of 
personnel currently onboard), gains (accessions) to date, losses to date, promotions/grade 
changes to date, designator changes to date, and current FY inventory versus current FY 
officer program authorization.  Policy decisions are guided by the U.S. Code for 
Personnel Strengths, as cited below. 
U.S. Code:  Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, § 115:  Personnel Strengths: 
Requirement for Annual Authorization. 
a. Active Duty and Selected Reserve End Strengths to be Authorized 
by Law 
Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each FY for each of 
the following: 
(1) The end strength for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast 
Guard) for (A) active-duty personnel who are to be paid from funds 
appropriated for active-duty personnel unless on active duty pursuant to 
subsection (b), and (B) active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard 
duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve 
personnel unless on active duty or full-time National Guard duty pursuant 
to subsection (b). 
(2) The end strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve component 
of the armed forces.8 
 Community Managers revise strength plans throughout the 
execution year, and analyze loss rates and retention data to ascertain trends.  They also 
                                                 
8 Title 10 USC § 115, “Personnel Strengths: Requirement For Annual Authorization,” Cornell 
University Law School, The Legal Information Institute, last accessed November 15, 2011, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/usc_sec_10_00000115----000-.html. 
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evaluate officer requests for recall to active duty, interservice transfers, lateral transfers, 
and retirements in regard to community end strength and need.  Community Managers 
utilize Officer Program Authorization (OPA) as guidance in the application of all force-
shaping tools.  The OPA is also known as the “inventory,” and will be referred to as OPA 
throughout this discussion.  It is most common to analyze inventory as it relates to 
decision making and policy planning. 
C. THE TENTH QUADRENNIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY 
COMPENSATION 
 Federal law directs that the President will complete “a review of the principles 
and concepts of the compensation system for members of the uniformed services.”9  This 
began in 1965 with the First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC).  
Ten reviews have been completed since.  These reviews capture important issues 
pertaining to the costs associated with maintaining a viable force.  They provide accurate 
analyses and recommendations that lead to improvements in the compensation system, 
and enable the services to remain competitive in labor markets while responding to 
rapidly changing operational needs. 
For the Tenth QRMC, President George W. Bush’s guidance was for the  
services to: 
Continue to recruit and retain highly qualified personnel for the uniformed 
services as they transform themselves to meet new challenges, the 
departments concerned must offer, in addition to challenging and 
rewarding duties, compensation appropriate to the services rendered to the 
Nation.  The departments also must apply the substantial taxpayer 
resources devoted to uniformed services compensation in the most 
effective manner possible.10 
 The QRMC underscores the importance of recruitment and retention, and serves 
as a reminder that these imperatives must be appropriately balanced using precious 
financial assets. 
                                                 
9 Title 37 U.S.C. § 1008, “Presidential recommendations concerning adjustments and changes in pay 
and allowances,” last accessed November 21, 2011, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/37/19/1008. 
10 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, The Report of the Tenth Quadrennial Review of 
Military Compensation (QRMC), (Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 2008), ix. 
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 This report also considered recommendations from the Defense Advisory 
Committee of Military Compensation (DACMC) report, an addendum to the initial 
assessment of the Tenth QMRC.  The data, analysis, and analytic framework included in 
the DACMC report was essential to implementing new legislation that supported the 
consolidation of Special and Incentive Pays (applicable to physicians), which was 
ultimately included in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 
 The report from the Tenth QRMC recognized that between FY ‘95 and ‘06 there 
were more civilians and contractors hired to provide health care services to the armed 
forces.  This caused reductions in the end strength of active duty health care 
professionals.  It noted that the authorized number of active duty physicians (billets) 
dropped by 12.6%, while concurrently the actual inventories (OPA) reflected a 13.8% 
decline in physicians.11  The number of physicians serving on active duty was declining 
at a more rapid rate than the rate of billet reductions. 
 The NDAA addressed this issue and suggested a careful examination of 
compensation issues pertaining to the uniformed medical personnel of the DoD.  This 
high-profile document notes the importance of reviewing the current inventory of 
physicians, exploring the underlying causes for the challenges facing the military in this 
professional group, and evaluates the effectiveness of existing recruitment and retention 
tools to meet force needs.  These concerns continue to be relevant to today’s MC 
community.12 
 When issued, the report from the Tenth QRMC showed that in 2007 military 
personnel costs totaled over $123 billion and made up 23% of defense spending.13 
D. MEDICAL CORPS SPECIAL PAY SYSTEM 
 It is important to understand the special pay system and how it relates to a 
physician’s salary.  There have been a number of studies that have examined if these 
                                                 
11 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, The Report of the Tenth Quadrennial Review of 
Military Compensation (QRMC), (Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 2008), 41. 
12 Ibid., 41. 
13 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, The Report of the Tenth Quadrennial Review of 
Military Compensation (QRMC), (Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 2008), 47. 
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special pays are serving their intended purpose, thus having a positive impact on 
retention.  That is beyond the scope of this study; however, it is equally important to 
understand how they fit into the life-cycle costs of the Navy’s accession programs, and 
how policy makers use them.  Each of these special pays is factored into a physicians’ 
total compensation in the Navy.  Military pay is a critical factor that affects retention, and 
we will use specialty types as a proxy for these pays in our study.  It is important to have 
a rudimentary understanding of what physicians are compensated for in order to 
effectively analyze the likelihood of a physician staying or leaving the Navy in pursuit of 
higher pay differentials. 
 Variable Special Pay (VSP) – Entitlement 
 Board Certified Pay (BCP) – Entitlement 
 Additional Special Pay (ASP) – Entitlement 
 Incentive Special Pay (ISP) – Discretionary Bonus (27 rates) 
 Multi-Year Special Pay (MSP) – Discretionary Bonus (27 rates;  
tiered 2, 3, and 4 years) 
 New Medical Corps Accession Bonus 
 Health Professional Loan Repayment Program – (HPLRP) Accessions and 
Retention 
 Critical Wartime Skills Accession Bonus(CWSAB)14 
E. MEDICAL CORPS CAREER PROGRESSION 
Figure 1 illustrates the typical career progression for a Navy physician.  It is 
important to understand how this timeline relates to recruiting, and to the factors a 
physician considers at the initial stay/leave decision point.  Some of those factors include 
special pays, training opportunities, promotions, and increased scope of practice.15 
                                                 
14 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction 7220.17:  “Special Pay for Medical 
Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Service Corps and Nurse Corps Officers, December 2005.”  BUPERS 
Reference Library, last accessed February 1, 2012, http://www.public.navy.mil/BUPERS-
NPC/REFERENCE/Pages/default.aspx. 
15 “Medical Corps Active Component Community Management,” brief to MC at Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery, Washington, D.C., October 2010, slides 10–17. 
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Figure 1.   Notional Medical Corps career progression and incentives16 
 An individual will enter the service at the grade of O-1 if sponsored financially as 
a medical student.  As shown above, they may be in an AFHPSP status or attending 
USUHS.  Upon completion of medical school they will supersede, or automatically 
promote, to O-3.  At this juncture, a student will begin internship training, followed by a 
General Medical Officer (GMO) or Flight Surgeon (FS) tour.  It is typically at this 
juncture that an AFHPSP or USUHS student is faced with their first stay/leave decision. 
 Some medical students will not complete a GMO or FS tour, and they will instead 
continue on through residency and fellowship training.  This is commonly referred to as 
specialty training.  This period of training can last three years or more.  The obligated 
service time for a specialist begins when they complete their training. 
                                                 
16 “Medical Corps Active Component Community Management,” brief to MC at Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery, Washington, D.C., October 2010, slides 10–17. 
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 Figure 1 also depicts when a Navy physician could be eligible for special pays, 
and at what grade.  As mentioned, this is a notional chart, and therefore this progression 
can vary depending upon the individual and their specialty. 
 There are five career tracks that an MC officer can take:  Clinical, Administrative, 
Academic, Research, and Operational.  This notional progression does not specifically 
capture each of these tracks; however, such a career transition would typically occur at 
the Department Head phase.  This is shown above, at the grade of O-5, as they become 
more senior.  The opportunities available for promotion and diversification all impact the 
first stay/leave decision. 
 While the milestone of residency implies that MC officers should be “residency 
trained specialists,” this does not mean that all MC officers are expected to meet this 
milestone.  General physicians (those that have not declared a specific specialty), such as 
GMOs, FSs, and Underwater Medical Officers (UMOs), are an important part of the 
fabric of the Navy healthcare mission.  A general physician is expected to demonstrate 
career progression by assuming duties within the scope of their practice that shows 
increased responsibility.  General physicians are not eligible for the same special pay 
options as a board certified specialist, and these factors are all taken into consideration at 
their first stay/leave decision.17 
F. NAVY RESERVE COMPONENT 
 This study evaluated the retention rates associated with the Reserve component of 
the MC.  The Navy’s Total Force initiative supports a lifetime of service, and is working 
to seamlessly integrate the Active and Reserve Components.  It is imperative that there is 
a mutually beneficial relationship and respect among these entities to support the mission, 
the sailor, and the overall needs of the Navy’s MC community.  This is a dynamic 
transition period that allows the Navy to capture and maintain continuity of service, as 
well as talent and expertise, in a competitive market. 
 As the Navy transitions to a “seamless” force, conversion from active duty to 
reserve status will become the cornerstone of this continuum of service.  There are two 
                                                 
17 “Medical Corps Active Component Community Management,” brief to MC at Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery, Washington, D.C., October 2010, slides 10–17. 
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Navy Administrative Messages (NAVADMINs) that encourage a lifetime of Navy 
service, and support the rapid and seamless transition from active to reserve status.18 
 If a physician chooses to leave active duty service at their first stay/leave decision 
point (OSD), they are able to transition to reserve status.  In this manner, the Navy 
captures their talent, capitalizes on their investment, and improves reserve accessions. 
1. What are the Navy Reserves? 
 The Navy Reserve provides support to the Active Duty Component.  There are 
several branches of the Navy Reserve, which can best be explained with the following 
chart.  Figure 2 depicts each of the Reserve Component elements. 
 
Figure 2.   Reserve Component elements 
 Each member of the Navy Reserve who is not currently serving on active duty is 
placed in one of three categories:  Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve (Active S1 or 
Inactive S2), or Retired.  The first two categories are of greatest interest to the reservist.  
Members in the Ready Reserve (USNR-R) and Standby Reserve Active (USNR-S1) are 





                                                 
18 A Navy Administrative Message (NAVADMIN) is an administrative message released to inform 
service members of new policies, policy updates, or changes. 
  RETIRED INACTIVEACTIVE  USNR
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(USNR-S2) are considered to be in an “inactive” status.  Everyone in “active” status is 
eligible to train with or without pay, serve on active duty for training, earn retirement 
points, and is considered for promotion.19 
 NAVETs are individuals who have received a commission as a Naval officer and 
are released from active duty (RAD), having completed their obligatory time.  If a 
NAVET holds a “USNR” commission, the member is “released” from active duty and 
transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  The member will remain a 
commissioned naval officer until a written request to “resign” the commission is 
submitted to the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS).  An officer’s commission will not 
expire unless it is determined there is career inactivity in a reserve status, at which time 
the member is processed out of the Navy with an honorable discharge. 
 “USN” commissioned officers that are “separated” from active duty must obtain a 
new oath of office as a United States Navy Reserve (USNR) officer.  If an oath is not 
administered, the member resigns their commission upon separation. 
 Officers with remaining service time (all commissions are administered for eight 
years of service) will automatically be placed in a USNR status.  Upon completion of the 
obligatory eight years, the commission remains active as long as long as the member 
maintains activity in the reserves. 
 These definitions are important to the definition of retention in the reserves.  For 
purposes of this study, an individual in an IRR status is not considered retained in  
the reserves. 
G. NAVY HEALTHCARE RETENTION STUDIES 
1. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
The following summarizes two physician pay and retention studies conducted by 
the CNA.  The first of these studies, from January 2002, is the Navy Specialty Physician 
Study:  Historical Overview, Retention Analysis, and Synopsis of Current Civilian-Sector 
Practices, and the second, dated March 2002, is the Health Professions’ Retention-
                                                 
19 Tom McAtee, “Information Track For New Naval Reservists,” Naval Reserve Association News 52, 
no. 2 (2005):  11–22. 
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Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special 
Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected Other Health Care Professionals). 
a. Navy Specialty Physician Study:  Historical Overview, Retention 
Analysis, and Synopsis of Current Civilian-Sector Practices 
The recommendations from this study form the foundation for this 
research.  The Navy Surgeon General asked CNA to develop “critical indicators” to track 
specific retention trends within the MC.  CNA quantified an improved index by 
measuring retention at the physician’s first opportunity to leave the Navy, or more 
commonly referred to as “end of initial active duty obligation.”20  This stay/leave 
decision point will be used to define retention in our study. 
Analysts continually assess the plans and policies that pertain to recruiting 
and retaining personnel.  Our research will be similar to this CNA study; however, it will 
examine how life-cycle costs influence policies and plans.  This would indicate whether 
manning shortfalls are related to retention issues, or if they are the result of an 
insufficient number of physicians being recruited in the training pipeline because of 
funding issues.  The training pipeline refers to those individuals attending medical school 
(AFHPSP program or attending USUHS) and all physicians in specialty training.  The 
time it takes to “grow” a physician impacts the planning process, and may have been a 
recruitment planning decision that took place over 11 years ago, depending upon  
the specialty. 
The data were obtained from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 
Manpower Information System (BUMIS), and consisted of the population of physicians 
on active duty for FYs ‘87 through ‘00.  It evaluated notable personnel trends within 
major physician specialties, examined accessions and attrition rates within the AFHPSP 
and USUHS programs, and explored some of the trends within the civilian sector. 
                                                 
20 Eric Christensen et al., Navy Specialty Physician Study:  Historical Overview, Retention Analysis, 
and Synopsis of Current Civilian-Sector Practices (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], 
January 2002).  Last accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research, archive locator:  CRM 
D0004916, 7. 
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They found that “overall the MC became 3 percent smaller over the last 
decade, while the number of full trained specialists increased by 16 percent.”21  Yet 
“trends show the number of active duty physicians placed in the GME training pipeline 
declined 35 percent.”22  These results suggest that this dramatic GME reduction could 
“impede the Navy’s ability to fill billets in the future (depending on how the number of 
billets changes over time).”23  Our study will look at data from FY ‘96 through FY ‘06 to 
determine how similar downsizing trends impacted recruitment, the training pipeline, and 
the force structure of the MC.  It will also consider the impact of a dramatic economic 
crisis and the start of armed conflict in March 2003. 
Finally, the analyses of the AFHPSP and USUHS programs illustrated a 
decline in retention since April 1988, when the Navy changed its policy with respect to 
obligations associated with GME training.  This was an area that warranted future 
research.24 
Additionally, and most notably, CNA strongly recommended that a study 
be conducted to determine “required retention rates by specialty,” and to “evaluate the 
cost of accessions with the cost of increasing retention by paying higher wages.”25  In 
conjunction with the retention rates study, an examination of how life-cycle costs vary by 
accession source would help to “compare the cost of meeting the desired expected profile 
of the medical corps through different accession sources to find the optimal accession 
source mix.”26  This research will focus specifically on this recommendation, and will 
examine current cost data provided by Navy Medicine Manpower, Personnel, Education, 
and Training Command (NAVMED MPTE). 
                                                 
21 Eric Christensen et al., Navy Specialty Physician Study:  Historical Overview, Retention Analysis, 
and Synopsis of Current Civilian-Sector Practices (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], 
January 2002).  Last accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research, archive locator:  CRM 
D0004916, 2. 
22 Ibid., 3. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 5. 
26 Ibid., 5. 
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b. Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report 
to Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special Pays and 
Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected Other Health Care 
Professionals) 
CNA completed a comprehensive examination of the Military Health 
System’s (MHS) health professions force structure and compensation plans in 2002.  It 
considers the Navy, Army, and Air Force; however, for purposes of our research, the 
discussion will only pertain to the Navy findings and recommendations. 
The CNA study examines whether or not uniformed health care 
professionals are being adequately compensated.  CNA took a three-phase approach to 
answering this question.  During phase one, analysts conducted a comparative analysis of 
compensation between uniformed and private sector health care professionals to 
determine if a pay gap existed.  Phases two and three examined retention and accession 
trends for specific specialties (the study included 23) as they related to the authorized 
billets and inventory.27 
In phase one, the pay gap analysis included physicians at their first stay-
leave decision point.  CNA aptly states that is important for decision makers to 
understand the accession sources for physicians, and the military obligations associated 
with those programs.  The accession source dictates the career path and time in service, 
which influence a physicians’ stay-leave decision. 
Table 1 illustrates the specialists considered in the CNA study, and the 
number of years of service at the specialists’ first stay-leave decision point.  This 
snapshot illustrates the differences in training timelines.28 
                                                 
27 Shayne Brannan et al., Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to 
Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected 
Other Health Care Professionals (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], March 2002).  Last 
accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research.  CRM D0004460.A5, 39. 
28 Ibid., 40. 
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Table 1.   MHS physician career profiles29 
 
 
                                                 
29 Shayne Brannan et al., Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to 
Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected 
Other Health Care Professionals (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], March 2002).  Last 
accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research.  CRM D0004460.A5, 40. 
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Considering physicians can retire when they reach 20 years of service, the 
time in training added to the time in service becomes a critical part of the  
decision-making process.  These results did not consider FAP because data were not 
available.  The analysis being conducted for this research will consider FAP and USUHS, 
and how those programs relate to inventory and retention.  In this CNA study, analysts 
did note that the USUHS students were more likely to remain in the military until 
retirement because they likely have prior enlisted or commissioned service before 
entering USUHS.  All time in service counts toward retirement years.30 
Military physicians that transition to a civilian career must consider 
benefits offered in a total compensation package from potential civilian employers.  
There are non-quantifiable differences in the nature of their work that can significantly 
impact the decision to leave.  These include unique factors such as likelihood of 
deployment, family stability, type and quality of medical equipment and facilities, and 
continuing medical education (CME) opportunities, to name a few.31  The study found 
that a “uniformed-civilian pay gap exists at every career junction for all specialties 
considered.”32 
Interestingly, in 1999, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published 
a report titled “What Does the Military ‘Pay Gap’ Mean?” 
Both areas—benefits and conditions of work—have features that might 
tend to make the military look particularly attractive, at least to some 
people, and other features that could tend to make the military service look 
unattractive.  If the attractive features predominate, the military might be 
able to offer lower pay than civilian employers; if the unattractive features 
predominate, DoD might have to pay a premium to meet its personnel 
needs.33 
                                                 
30 Shayne Brannan et al., Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to 
Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected 
Other Health Care Professionals (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], March 2002).  Last 
accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research.  CRM D0004460.A5, 3. 
31 Ibid., 2. 
32 Ibid., 37. 
33 Ibid., 3. 
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This is extremely important because it unequivocally states that the mere 
existence of a pay gap does not ascertain if pay affects retention.  This suggests that 
monetary incentives would be negligible.  Our study will therefore not examine special 
pays and their impact on retention.  We will examine how life-cycle costs of each of the 
Navy’s accession programs impacts recruitment policies. 
2. Military Health System (MHS) 
 It is strategically imperative that the MHS meet its workforce objectives.  These 
include force structure, pay grade structure, billet authorizations, readiness requirements, 
experience, retention, and the effect of pay on retention.  These factors are all considered, 
in conjunction with the adequacy of existing pay and accession bonuses, during the 
personnel planning process.34 
 CNA suggests that it may not be enough to only imply causality to the pay gap, 
and it is equally valuable to discuss how the MHS establishes its priorities.  Ultimately, 
they argue, the direction of the MHS dictates how we access and retain physicians.  
Sometimes the decisions pertaining to the direction of the Navy’s MC has little to do with 
pay gap issues, and more to do with size of the force and Congressional budget 
constraints that affect end strength numbers.  Either way, policy makers must take these 
decisions into consideration when designing scholarship programs, loan forgiveness 
programs, and the special pay system for total physician compensation. 
 Each of these programs has seen fluctuations in accession and retention figures, 
which significantly impacts the training pipeline for physicians.  As discussed, new 
accessions are “deferred” and may not be able to practice medicine for the Navy as a 
licensed general practitioner or board certified specialist for many years because they are 
training.  These “deferred” individuals change the inventory, especially as accession 
numbers change with each FY. 
 
                                                 
34 Shayne Brannan et al., Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to 
Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected 
Other Health Care Professionals.  (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], March 2002).  
Last accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research.  CRM D0004460.A5, 38. 
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 The MHS has undergone various transformations and began to stabilize in the late 
1990s.  Historically, the services were able to easily access medical professionals into the 
procurement pipeline.  They competed fiercely with generous signing bonuses, medical 
school debt relief assistance, and tailored benefit packages.  These expensive accession 
programs do not always account for the complexities in the planning process, and CNA 
found that “DoD was unable to establish a reliable and consistent accession source,” and 
“often overemphasized the importance of the military-civilian pay gap . . . by initiating a 
wide array of special pay programs.”35  To help simplify the process, CNA recommends 
streamlining the special pay system to fewer categories.  These would be adjusted for 
inflation, and would provide greater flexibility to invoke or suppress initiatives needed to 
achieve desired workforce objectives.36  These options specifically included an increase 
to entitlement special pays, to increase caps on discretionary special pays, granting 
accession bonus authority to fully qualified specialists, indexing entitlement special pays 
(increasing ASP, VSP, and BCP annually at the rate of Regular Military Compensation 
(RMC), and offering a critical skills retention bonus (CSRB). 
 In conjunction with these findings, one of the most striking changes to the MHS 
was the deliberate downsizing of the force.  Table 2 captures the total MHS inventory 
from FY ‘91 through FY ‘00.  The inventory reduction suggests that losses may not be a 
retention problem related to a military-civilian pay gap, but rather a conscious business 
decision.  Nonetheless, these decisions all negatively impacted the training and accession 
pipelines for physicians.  The effects of those decisions are still being felt today, as will 
be revealed in the discussion section of this research.37 
                                                 
35 Shayne Brannan et al., Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to 
Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected 
Other Health Care Professionals (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], March 2002).  Last 
accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research.  CRM D0004460.A5, 7. 
36 Ibid., 9. 
37 Ibid., 43. 
 25




By FY ‘00, MHS inventory had dropped by 15% from FY ‘91.39 
 CNA compared the inventories, by specialty, to future manning and readiness 
requirements, and concluded that, in most cases, the Navy met its readiness requirements.  
Anesthesiology, plastic surgery, and general surgery were the exceptions.  In all cases, 
CNA recommended bringing more physicians into the training pipeline or acquiring more 
specialists through FAP.  This research will evaluate the effectiveness of the Navy’s FAP 
program.  Another recommendation was to either improve retention or decrease attrition.  
The aforementioned options pertaining to special pays would address those 
recommendations, and will be examined in this research.40 
Figure 3 captures the descriptive statistics for attrition rates from FY ‘91 through 
FY ‘98.  This is valuable because it shows attrition as relatively constant until FY ‘98, 
                                                 
38 Shayne Brannan et al., Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to 
Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected 
Other Health Care Professionals.  (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], March 2002).  
Last accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research.  CRM D0004460.A5, 43. 
39 Ibid., 42. 
40 Ibid., 62. 
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and we can compare this statistic to those found in our analysis of current FY trends in 
light of a protracted war and economic downturn.41 
 
 
Figure 3.   Model attrition rates for FYs ‘91–’9842 
 A duration model was used to determine if the military-civilian pay gap was 
correlated with whether a physician stays or leaves the Navy at a higher rate at any given 
time t, given that the physician has been unobligated for a defined period of time leading 
up to time t.  In statistical literature this is known as the hazard rate, and in the context of 
this study it is known as the attrition rate of unobligated physicians.43  This proved 
inconclusive because the initial OSD field was missing in the database from Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC). 
 We will not be using a duration model; however, the BUMIS data contains this 
required field, and we will be able to analyze this relationship.  We expect that a pay gap 
will exist, but this will prove inconsequential to this research, as we will be focused upon 
how life-cycle costs impact retention. 
 The second model compared initial Active Duty Obligations (ADOs) by specialty 
over five FYs.  In the aggregate, it showed that short-term retention had a positive and 
significant effect on AFHPSP and USUHS students.  We will reexamine BUMIS data for 
current cohorts that have served during an economic downturn and protracted war. 
                                                 
41 Shayne Brannan et al., Health Professions’ Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to 
Congress (Phases II & III:  Adequacy of Special Pays and Bonuses for Medical Officers and Selected 
Other Health Care Professionals  (Alexandria, VA:  Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], March 2002).  Last 
accessed October 2, 2001, http://www.cna.org/research.  CRM D0004460.A5, 42. 
42 Ibid., 42. 
43 Ibid., 62. 
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a. General Accounting Office:  Military Personnel:  Status of 
Accession, Retention, and End Strength for Military Medical 
Officers and Preliminary Observations Regarding Accession and 
Retention Challenges, April 2009 
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report accompanying the 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY ‘09 directed the Comptroller General to 
report by April 1, 2009, to the congressional defense committees on a study of medical 
and dental personnel requirements for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, including their 
reserve components, to meet their medical missions.  More specifically, they were tasked 
with examining recruitment and retention goals.  The objectives of this report  
were inclusive: 
 How is DoD organized to recruit medical students and access medical 
officers across the military services? 
 To what extent did the Active and Reserve components meet their annual 
accession goals for medical officers in FYs ‘01 through ‘08? 
 To what extent did the Active and Reserve components retain medical 
officers in FYs ‘01 through ‘08? 
 To what extent did the Active and Reserve components meet their annual 
authorizations for medical officers in FYs ‘01 through ‘08? 
 What challenges, if any, have the military services faced in their accession 
and retention of medical officers, and what plans have they developed to 
address those challenges?44 
Our research will look at specific retention percentages for accession 
programs, but it will also look at which factors were significant and which factors 
affected those rates.  Our research did not adequately address specific plans; however, it 
will discuss cost estimation issues pertaining to accession plans.  Our research will also 
look at how those figures are factored into policy development. 
                                                 
44 General Accounting Office, Military Personnel:  Status of Accession, Retention, and End Strength 
for Military Medical Officers and Preliminary Observations Regarding Accession and Retention 
Challenges, GAO-09-469R Military Personnel (Washington, D.C., April 16, 2009), Briefing to 
Congressional Committees. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. ACTIVE COMPONENT DATA 
This chapter describes the data, variables, and methodology used to analyze the 
effects of accession source on retention for active duty MC officers.  The primary data 
used for this study was obtained from the MC Career Planning Office at the BUMED.  
The data were separated by cohort based on the year of entry into the active duty MC.  
The data included information for 3,864 physicians who joined the Navy between FY ‘96 
and ‘06.  The data included date of entry, end of initial military OSD, as well as 
demographic information such as gender and ethnicity.  The cohort datasets were then 
merged with Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) data to obtain the state the physician was 
recruited from, Grade Point Average (GPA), specialty code, and marital status. 
The merged datasets provide the following variables for the multivariate probit 
regression model used in this study. 
1. Dependent Variable 
a. Retention 
“Retained 1-Year” is used as the dependent variable for the model.  It is 
defined as a member staying a minimum of one year beyond the expiration of their 
original MSO.  This is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the member was retained, 
and 0 otherwise.  Those members who had not yet reached the end of their first OSD and 
those who were still on active duty, but had not yet reached one year past their service 
obligation, were excluded.  Table 3 illustrates this breakdown. 
Table 3.   Dependent variable characteristics 
Retention Status Number of Observations Percentage 
Retained One Year 2,535 65.61
Not Retained One Year 1,329 34.39
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2. Explanatory Variables 
a. Accession Year 
“Accession Year” is defined as the year that a licensed physician begins 
their commissioned service.  A binary variable was created for each FY from ‘96 through 
‘06, with 1 annotating service beginning during that year.  Table 3 shows the 
characteristics of the merged dataset for the FY of accession.  BUMED provided data 
from FYs ‘96 through ‘10.  FY ‘06 was the last year that the majority of accessions had 
time to reach the end of their OSD, also referred to as the completion of MSO.  Anyone 
accessed after FY ‘06 was excluded from the study because they did not have enough 
time in service to complete their MSO. 
Table 4 shows the percentage of accessions broken down by cohort year.  
There is a steady downward trend in accessions beginning in FY ‘01 through FY ‘06, 
likely due to changes in accession goals and recruiting environment.  The low point for 
accessions is FY ‘05.  From FY ‘05 through ‘06 there is a marked increase in the percent 
retained.  The Navy released a new special pay instruction, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, OPNAV Instruction 7220.17, in 2005, which outlines the special pay policy 
for the MC, Dental Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Nurse Corps Officers.  This policy 
update may account for the upward trend in retention from FY ‘05 through ‘06.  Another 
likely cause could be the state of the economy, coupled with the ongoing Iraq war. 
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Table 4.   Cohort data characteristics 
Cohort Year Number Accessed 
Number Reaching 




(One Year Past 
OSD) 
1996 331 331 71
1997 376 376 66
1998 408 408 67
1999 411 411 64
2000 402 401 60
2001 395 303 64
2002 366 364 65
2003 333 330 64
2004 339 332 65
2005 296 287 73
2006 332 292 74
 
b. Program of Entry 
Table 5 illustrates “Program of Entry,” and is divided into five variables:  
HPSP, NADDS, NADDS 1-Year Delay, USUHS, and Other.  A binary variable is created 
for each variable with 1 being recruited through the variable name program, and 
0 otherwise. 
Table 5.   Recruitment program variables 
Program of Entry Number of Observations Percentage 
HPSP 2,214 57.30
NADDS 470 12.16




HPSP creates a pipeline of potential Navy physicians who will access onto 
active duty upon the successful completion of medical school.  Additionally, it accounts 
for more than half of all physician accessions. 
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USUHS is a triservice medical school, with limited accessions per year.  
The maximum authorized accessions are typically limited to 51 students per year, which 
is approximately 15%–20% of the total medical accessions each year.  It is the most 
common medical school for prior service medical students.  Time at USUHS counts 
toward total time in service, and is creditable toward retirement.  Prior service USUHS 
physicians often complete 20 years of service long before their civilian counterparts. 
The “Other” variable includes those recruited through the DA program 
and those recalled to active duty.  The “1-Year Delay” variable accounts for physicians 
completing an additional year of training immediately following completion of civilian 
medical school.  This delays their entry into active duty by one year.  Reserve officers are 
those recalled to active duty, and usually to undermanned specialties.  The recall program 
is used as a valve to complement student programs. 
3. Demographic Variables 
Demographic variables included gender, race, and ethnicity, region recruited 
from, prior service status, and marital status at time of entry in the service. 
a. Recruit Region 
For the purposes of the study we divided the states into seven regions.  
Some states had too few recruits to generate statistically significant results, thus the 
reason we aggregate the states into recruit regions.  The New England region includes 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  The 
Mid-Atlantic region is comprised of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. The South region includes Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.  The Mid-West region includes Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin.  The Southwest region includes Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.  
The West region is comprised of Alaska, Colorado, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  The variable “Region Unknown” 
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was used for those observations that were listed as unknown.  Recruits from Puerto Rico 
were included in “unknown” because the sample size was too small. 
Table 6 shows that the South and Mid-West have the highest number of 
accessions, which matches historical data from Navy recruiting. 
Table 6.   Recruit region 
Region Recruited From Percentage 






Region Unknown 18.23 
 
b. Prior Service 
Prior service is defined as being prior enlisted, a prior commissioned 
officer, or a warrant officer in any branch of the military.  A binary variable is used for 
each variable.  Table 7 shows that only 16.79% of the MC has any prior service 
experience. 
Table 7.   Prior service status characteristics 
Prior Service Status Percentage 
No Prior Service 83.21 
Prior Enlisted 7.85 
Prior Officer 8.94 
 
c. Race 
The race variable identifies racial background for each of the individuals 
in this study.  Race data showed if the person was Caucasian, Black, Asian, or  




excluded from the study.  Ethnicity data shows if the member was Hispanic or  
Non-Hispanic.  Table 8 shows that these figures reflect a lack of diversity in the  
MC community. 
Table 8.   Race, gender, and marital status characteristics 
Variable Number of Observations Percentage 
Caucasian 3,158 81.73 
Black 204 5.28 
Asian 240 6.21 
Other Race 262 6.78 
Male 2,815 72.85 
Married 807 20.88 
Divorced 40 1.05 
Single 3,017 78.08 
 
d. Specialists 
A physician can specialize in a specific field of medicine such as 
cardiology, orthopedic surgery or internal medicine, to name a few.  The Navy recruits 
board-certified specialists.  The dataset contains information on type of specialty when 
recruited.  The specialty of a Navy physician is an important variable when analyzing 
retention.  Navy specialists are entitled to additional specialty pay and retention bonuses 
that add to their total compensation.  Similarly, the type of specialty is factored into a 
physicians’ earning potential in the civilian workforce.  The specialty can affect the 
likelihood of deployment during times of war, as well as the overall work environment of 
practicing medicine in the Navy.  Ultimately, all of these factors affect a physicians’ 
decision to stay or leave the military. 
The dataset does not contain information on specialty bonuses, 
deployment history, or job satisfaction.  Therefore, we include binary variables that 
capture the specialty held by the physician since bonus pay in the military varies by 
specialty.  We believe that the specialty indicator variable provides a valid proxy for 
bonuses.  Specialists are entitled to special pay and bonuses, and this study assumes those 
physicians have accepted those monies.  This allows us to determine whether the type of 
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specialty affects retention, capturing elements of each of the aforementioned factors.  
However, this variable only captures a small percentage of physician specialists when 
compared to the overall number of accessions for Navy Medicine.  Table 9 defines the 
variables as “general surgery,” “general practitioner,” and “other specialty.”  Specialists 
were too small to be included individually, and were therefore grouped as “other 
specialty.”  This variable includes Aerospace Medicine, Cardiology, Family Practice, 
Neurology, Orthopedics, Psychiatry, Radiology, and Pediatrics. 







The dataset includes educational data on undergraduate major and GPA.  
The education variable only captures the undergraduate degree at the time of accession.  
It does not capture advanced degrees because the dataset did not contain medical school 
information.  Binary variables for undergraduate majors are included to determine if this 
affects the likelihood of retention for MC officers.  Data categorizing undergraduate 
degrees were given for 16 degree fields of study.  Binary variables were created for 
health professions, biology, physical science, psychology, engineering, and other degrees. 
GPA is used as an explanatory variable to help determine whether or not 
the quality of physician recruited has an effect on retention.  GPA is the only continuous 
variable used in this study.  Table 10 shows the average GPA for the data set was 3.55, 






Table 10.   Education 








B. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A medical officer’s decision to stay is affected by several demographic variables 
that remain constant during his/her career.  There are other factors during the span of a 
career that can change over time, and can be captured.  Given the binary nature of the 
dependent variable, a multivariate probit regression model is most appropriate to estimate 
the marginal effect of the various independent variables on a medical officer’s retention 
decision probability. 
The dependent variable is “retained one-year,” and is representative of a medical 
officers’ decision to remain on active duty. 
1. Model 
The primary model equation is used to estimate the likelihood a medical officer 
will stay after controlling observable background characteristics. 
 
2. Minority Model 
We estimate a separate model for minorities by restricting the sample only to 
Caucasian officers.  The model investigates the effect of accession source on retention for 
minorities.  The control variables are the same as those specified in the main model. 
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3. Gender Model (Females Only) 
To investigate whether the accession source has a different effect on each gender 
we also estimate the model by restricting the sample to females, and then again for males. 
C. MARKOV MODELS 
The aggregate probabilities from this data were used to create Markov models to 
predict the future end strength of the MC.  The Markov model predicts the survivability 
of physicians based upon accession source.  The data contains 11,790 total observations.  
To forecast the health of the Navy active duty MC, we use the data collected from 
BUMED.  The data contain accession sources for FYs ‘81 through ‘10. 
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IV. RESULTS 
The results of our analysis are presented below.  This section only contains 
statistically significant results.  Full estimation results are found in Appendices A through 
C.  We first discuss the probit results.  Next, we present the forecasts for survivability of 
the accession programs using the Markov model.45  Finally, we present the life-cycle 
costs associated across the different accession sources. 
A. ACTIVE DUTY RESULTS 
1. Probit Analyses 
Table 11 provides the multivariate probit regression results for the primary probit 
model equation.  These results provide insight on the likelihood a medical officer is 
retained one year across different accession sources after controlling for cohort year.  The 
results from Table 11 suggest that USUHS and those in the “other” category were more 
likely to retain than AFHPSP students.  USUHS students were 28% more likely than 
AFHPSP to be retained one year beyond their OSD.  Conversely, NADDSs were 48% 
less likely to be retained one year beyond their OSD.  The “Other” category captures 
Direct Accessions and Recalls, both licensed physician categories.  Prior enlisted were 
shown to be less likely to stay.  Both of these results were statistically significant.  All 
results are significant at the 95% confidence level.  This coincides with previous 
discussions pertaining to USUHS students being primarily prior service, and likely to be 
vested in Navy career.  USUHS is “prior service,” which includes both prior officers and 
enlisted service members.  This may account for the contrast to prior enlisted being less 
likely to stay. 
                                                 
45 We also run the same probit models for the Reserve Component; however, we do not present the 
results because the data were incomplete and unreliable for statistical inference. 
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Table 11.   Primary model results 
Primary Model – Regression Results 
Variables (1) Probit Results 
(2) 
Marginal Effects 
USUHS 1.1577*** (0.1438) 
0.2894*** 
(0.0208) 
NADDS -1.3105*** (0.0853) 
-0.4870*** 
(0.0282) 
NADDS_1_YR -0.7736*** (0.1043) 
-0.2962*** 
(0.0404) 
FAP -0.7290*** (0.1118) 
-0.2793*** 
(0.0436) 
OTHER 0.2225* (0.1242) 
0.0733* 
(0.0384) 
female 0.0547 (0.0648) 
0.0189 
(0.0223) 
Asian -0.0006 (0.1163) 
-0.0002 
(0.0406) 
Black 0.0670 (0.1277) 
0.0230 
(0.0431) 
other_race -0.8332*** (0.1475) 
-0.3198*** 
(0.0565) 





Table 12 shows the results when evaluating the effect of accession source on 
retention for minorities only.  Minorities are those accessions listed as Black, Asian, or 
Other race.  When compared to AFHPSP, USUHS is the only accession source that 
reveals positive and significant results.  Among minorities, Blacks are the only group that 
is more likely to be retained. 
Table 12.   Minority model results 
Minority Model – Regression Results 
Variables (1) Probit Results 
(2) 
Marginal Effects 
USUHS 1.2865*** (0.3666) 
0.4055*** 
(0.0710) 
NADDS -1.3348*** (0.2347) 
-0.4810*** 
(0.0658) 
NADDS_1_YR -0.8762*** (0.2506) 
-0.3272*** 
(0.0798) 
FAP -0.3610 (0.2814) 
-0.1430 
(0.1092) 
OTHER 0.2189 (0.3135) 
0.0856 
(0.1199) 
female -0.0723 (0.1637) 
-0.0288 
(0.0651) 
Asian 0.8556*** (0.2306) 
0.3258*** 
(0.0818) 




Table 13 shows the results when evaluating the effect of different accession 
sources on retention for the female and male samples.  For both females and males, only 
USUHS has a positive effect on retention when compared to AFHPSP.  The probability 
of a male student at USUHS being retained is 15% higher when compared to females.  
Additionally, the “Other race” variable has a negative effect on retention for both females 
and males.  All results are statistically significant. 
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Table 13.   Gender model results 
Females Only – Regression Results 
Variables (1) Probit Results 
(2) 
Marginal Effects 
USUHS 1.0072*** (0.2673) 
0.2873*** 
(0.0499) 
NADDS -1.3944*** (0.1622) 
-0.5138*** 
(0.0496) 
NADDS_1_YR -0.9982*** (0.1897) 
-0.3823*** 
(0.0668) 
FAP -0.6112** (0.2556) 
-0.2381** 
(0.1000) 
OTHER -0.0359 (0.2969) 
-0.0132 
(0.1104) 
Asian -0.2032 (0.2403) 
-0.0769 
(0.0932) 
Black -0.0759 (0.1924) 
-0.0282 
(0.0722) 
other_race -1.1587*** (0.3206) 
-0.4354*** 
(0.1017) 
Males Only – Regression Results 
Variables (1) Probit Results 
(2) 
Marginal Effects 
USUHS 1.1597*** (0.1439) 
0.2896*** 
(0.0207) 
NADDS -1.3082*** (0.0852) 
-0.4862*** 
(0.0282) 
NADDS_1_YR -0.7705*** (0.1043) 
-0.2950*** 
(0.0404) 
FAP -0.7337*** (0.1116) 
-0.2811*** 
(0.0435) 
OTHER 0.2158* (0.1240) 
0.0712* 
(0.0385) 
Asian -0.0020 (0.1163) 
-0.0007 
(0.0406) 
Black 0.0801 (0.1268) 
0.0274 
(0.0425) 
other_race -0.8341*** (0.1475) 
-0.3201*** 
(0.0564) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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B. MARKOV MODELS 
We carried over the multivariate probit regression model results into a  
Markov Model to predict the survivability of accessions by program until 20 years of 
service.  These figures are estimated for those accessed beginning in FY ‘96 and are 
carried through for all accessions until FY ‘10. 
The Markov model uses the retention probabilities estimated via the probit model 
and the continuation rates contained in the BUMED dataset.  The probability of years of 
service is calculated per accession source to predict numbers of years served for each FY 
by cohort. 
Table 14 is consistent with the multivariate probit regression results.  It shows that 
USUHS has the highest probability of a physician serving 20 years, at 0.41.  While 
USUHS has a high survivability probability at 10 years, it drops significantly at the  
20-year mark.  The probability of a physician from USUHS serving 10 years is 0.95.  
Again, this is consistent with previous results and recognizes the fact that a USUHS 
physician will likely have prior service time, and was eligible for retirement prior to 
serving 20 years as physician.  Table 15 shows that the probability of a physician from 
AFHPSP serving 10 years is 0.46. 
Table 14.   USUHS continuation table 
 
Probability of Retention 1 1 1 1 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.85 0.75 0.65 0.58 0.5 0.48 0.46 0.4 0.41
Fiscal Year Number Accessed
1996 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 46 46 45 41 36 31 28 25 23 22 21 20
1997 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 46 46 45 41 36 31 28 25 23 22 21 20
1998 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 46 46 45 41 36 31 28 25 23 22 21 20
1999 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 49 48 48 47 43 38 33 29 27 24 23 22 21
2000 51 51 51 51 51 50 50 50 50 49 48 47 43 38 33 30 27 24 23 22 21
2001 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 42 42 41 41 40 37 32 28 25 23 21 20 18 18
2002 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 48 47 47 46 42 37 32 28 26 24 23 21 20
2003 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 46 46 45 41 36 31 28 25 23 22 21 20
2004 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 42 42 41 41 40 37 32 28 25 23 21 20 18 18
2005 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 46 45 45 44 40 35 31 27 25 23 22 20 19
2006 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 37 37 36 36 35 32 29 25 22 20 18 17 16 16
2007 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 46 45 45 44 40 35 31 27 25 23 22 20 19
2008 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 46 45 45 44 40 35 31 27 25 23 22 20 19
2009 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 44 44 43 43 42 38 34 29 26 24 22 21 19 18
2010 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 46 45 45 44 40 35 31 27 25 23 22 20 19
Years of Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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Table 15.   AFHPSP continuation table 
 
 
Only USUHS and AFHPSP have a probability greater than 0.30 of reaching 10 
years of service.  For all accessions programs, with the exception of USUHS and 
AFHPSP, the highest percentage of physicians leaving the Navy is between 5 and 10 
years of service.  For USUHS and AFHPSP, it is between the 10- and 15-year point.46 
C. COST ANALYSIS 
Based on cost estimation data received from NAVMED MPTE, we were able to 
calculate the average cost by accession program for FY ‘10.  Cost data were provided for 
only AFHPSP, FAP, and those programs contained in the “Other” category. 
Using continuation Tables 14 and 15, we took the number of accessions and 
forecasted career continuation probabilities to the 5-year and 10-year point in a 
physicians’ career for each program.  We then multiplied these accessions by the years of 
service to obtain the total years of available service.  Ten years would represent the career 
midpoint, and 20 would represent a full 20-year career as a Navy physician.  We chose 
                                                 
46 Additional continuation tables for all accession programs can be found in Appendices D through G.  
This discussion is limited to USUHS and AFHPSP, the two accession programs with the highest 
probability for retaining Navy physicians. 
Probability of Retention 1 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.91 0.78 0.7 0.64 0.54 0.46 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.2 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18
Fiscal Year Number Accessed
1996 188 188 186 184 180 171 147 132 120 102 86 71 60 51 45 41 38 36 36 34 34
1997 208 208 206 204 200 189 162 146 133 112 96 79 67 56 50 46 42 40 40 37 37
1998 224 224 222 220 215 204 175 157 143 121 103 85 72 60 54 49 45 43 43 40 40
1999 209 209 207 205 201 190 163 146 134 113 96 79 67 56 50 46 42 40 40 38 38
2000 200 200 198 196 192 182 156 140 128 108 92 76 64 54 48 44 40 38 38 36 36
2001 221 221 219 217 212 201 172 155 141 119 102 84 71 60 53 49 44 42 42 40 40
2002 204 204 202 200 196 186 159 143 131 110 94 78 65 55 49 45 41 39 39 37 37
2003 210 210 208 206 202 191 164 147 134 113 97 80 67 57 50 46 42 40 40 38 38
2004 207 207 205 203 199 188 161 145 132 112 95 79 66 56 50 46 41 39 39 37 37
2005 199 199 197 195 191 181 155 139 127 107 92 76 64 54 48 44 40 38 38 36 36
2006 213 213 211 209 204 194 166 149 136 115 98 81 68 58 51 47 43 40 40 38 38
2007 201 201 199 197 193 183 157 141 129 109 92 76 64 54 48 44 40 38 38 36 36
2008 208 208 206 204 200 189 162 146 133 112 96 79 67 56 50 46 42 40 40 37 37
2009 173 173 171 170 166 157 135 121 111 93 80 66 55 47 42 38 35 33 33 31 31
2010 174 174 172 171 167 158 136 122 111 94 80 66 56 47 42 38 35 33 33 31 31
Years of Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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5 and 10 years to analyze, as these years represent critical decision-making juncture 
points, both when developing accession policies and within a physician’s career. 
Table 16 shows that for 174 AFHPSP accessions, at 10 years of service this 
would yield 1,740 total years of available service.  We then took the total program cost 
and divided it by actual years served.  Program costs were provided by NAVMED 
MPTE.  Actual years served equals the sum of the “predicted” number of physicians from 
year 1 through year 10, as represented on the continuation tables.  For AFHPSP (Table 
16), the sum of the predicted number of physicians serving is 1,385.  The total cost is 
then divided by the predicted years served to obtain the accession cost per year by 
program.  Table 17 displays similar results for officers at the 5-year point in a  
physician’s career. 
Table 16.   Accession cost of year served at career midpoint 

















AFHPSP 174 $45,686,588 1,740 1,385 $32,986.70 79
FAP 17 $3,111,778 170 112 $27,783.72 65
OTHER 22 $580,444 220 139 $4,175.58 63
Table 17.   Accession cost of year served at five years 



















AFHPSP 174 $45,686,588 870 842 $54,259.60 97
FAP 17 $3,111,778 85 74 $42,051.05 87




From this data, you can calculate the percentage of years served by comparing 
total years available to predicted values.  AFHPSP students serve 79% of the years 
available at year 10. 
When compared to “Other,” AFHPSP accessions served 16% more of the years 
available at 12% higher costs.  “Other” and FAP accessions are cheaper in the short term; 
however, when you extend the model out to 10 years, AFHPSP gains value.  For total 
years served, AFHPSP provides more value long term. 
Policy makers need to determine whether short-term accessions or long-term 




Retention is an important facet in the manning of the MC, and it has a significant 
impact on the ability to meet the Navy medical mission.  This study evaluates how 
effectively the different accession programs in the MC community retain physicians.  The 
Navy has various accession programs aimed at recruiting physicians at different points in 
their training.  We analyze the retention rates for each of the Navy’s MC accession 
programs at the physicians’ first stay/leave decision point, otherwise referred to as the 
end of OSD.  A physician can leave the Navy at this point, and will have gained 
invaluable hands-on training and leadership experience.  This study examines several 
accession programs to determine if they are serving their intended purpose, and if they 
are having a positive impact on retention.  Additionally, this study looks at the life-cycle 
costs of BUMED accession programs. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a multivariate probit regression we analyze the effect of different accession 
sources on a medical officer being retained one year beyond the end of service obligation.  
This analysis is important because it shows that the Navy is losing the largest percentage 
of their MC officers between 5 and 10 years of service.  If we increase accessions to 
programs where officers have a lower probability of being retained, then, over the long 
term, the Navy will see manning shortages in the force structure of the MC.  
Additionally, it is more cost-effective to recruit people to programs with a higher rate of 
retention, than utilizing retention bonuses to compensate for retention rates. 
Our results suggest that officers coming through USUHS and those in the “Other” 
category are more likely to retain when compared to AFHPSP.  Among minorities, 
Blacks are the only group that is more likely to retain.  Among females, only USUHS has 
a positive effect on retention when compared to AFHPSP.  This may result from prior 
service knowledge and experience influencing their decision to stay in the Navy.  Males 
show the same result, with even stronger probability toward retention.  Additionally, the 
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“Other race” variable has a negative effect on retention.  Prior enlisted were shown to 
retain at lower rates.  This may be attributed to the lifestyle changes they encounter when 
transitioning from the enlisted ranks to the officer community.  All aforementioned 
results were significant. 
The Markov models show that for all accessions programs, with exception of 
USUHS and AFHPSP, the highest percentage of physicians leaving the Navy occurs 
between 5 and 10 years of service.  For USUHS and AFHPSP, it is between the 10- and 
15-year point. 
From cost estimation data received from NAVMED MPTE, we calculated the 
average cost by accession program for FY ‘10.  Based on aggregate figures, we were able 
to compare the short-term and long-term costs associated with each program. 
When compared to “Other,” AFHPSP accessions served 16% more of the years 
available at 12% higher costs.  Other and FAP accessions are cheaper in the short term; 
however, when you extend the model out to 10 years, AFHPSP gains value.  For total 
years served, AFHPSP provides more value long term.  If the MC goal is to provide long-
term retention in the Navy, than accession policies should consider the long-term costs 
and benefits of accession programs, instead of total accessions per FY. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While we believe that our study provides important insight into the differing 
effects of accession programs on retention, we encourage future research on this topic.  
The limitations in our study come from the lack of suitable data that can fully address the 
research question and thus recommend better data collection processes from the MC 
community.  There are many factors that affect the likelihood a medical officer will stay 
in the military after their initial obligation.  In particular, marital status, number of 
dependents, and marketability and quality of medical school, are important explanatory 
factors to name a few.  Our study was unable to address how these variables can change 
the likelihood of retention by different accession programs because the data do not 
account for variables that may change over time.  Marital status information and specialty 
data is only provided at the time of entry into service.  Both of these variables can change  
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over time and affect the probability of retention.  Having data that shows the marital 
status and specialty at the end of obligated service would have enhanced this study’s 
ability to analyze the effect on retention. 
Another important variable is performance during service.  While GPA is a proxy 
of officer quality at the time of recruitment, it does not measure the quality of 
performance during service.  Fitness Report data would have enhanced this study’s 
ability to show if the Navy is retaining the highest-performing medical officers. 
Another limitation of the data pertains to the cohort years captured in this 
analysis.  While 10 years of cohort data is significant, the usable data stops with FY ‘06.  
This limits our ability to study the impact of the ensuing economic recession in the 
following FY.  The economy and employment opportunities in the civilian workforce 
would greatly impact a physician’s decision to stay or leave the service, and this would 
be an area for future research.  Furthermore, while deployment history was available for 
members on active duty, it was not available for those who are no longer on active duty.  
Therefore, deployment information had to be excluded as an explanatory variable.  The 
frequency and length of deployment, especially in light of a protracted war, would 
definitely have an impact on retention and should be further researched.  Bonus 
information was also not included in this analysis though we used specialty indicators to 
proxy for differences in bonus pay.  Bonus information, including the amount offered, 
would affect retention especially when comparing the amount to civilian pay.  Finally, we 
encourage better data collection processes for the MC officers in the reserves. 
There are many factors that influence a member’s decision to stay or leave the 
military.  These factors are likely universal, regardless of military occupation.  While 
these data capture several of those factors, we hope that researchers will continue to 
examine this research question to better assist the MC to achieve their mission. 
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APPENDIX A. PRIMARY MODEL RESULTS 
Primary Model – Regression Results 
Variables (1) Probit Results 
(2) 
Marginal Effects 
USUHS 1.1577*** (0.1438) 
0.2894*** 
(0.0208) 
NADDS -1.3105*** (0.0853) 
-0.4870*** 
(0.0282) 
NADDS_1_YR -0.7736*** (0.1043) 
-0.2962*** 
(0.0404) 
FAP -0.7290*** (0.1118) 
-0.2793*** 
(0.0436) 
OTHER 0.2225* (0.1242) 
0.0733* 
(0.0384) 
female 0.0547 (0.0648) 
0.0189 
(0.0223) 
Asian -0.0006 (0.1163) 
-0.0002 
(0.0406) 
Black 0.0670 (0.1277) 
0.0230 
(0.0431) 
other_race -0.8332*** (0.1475) 
-0.3198*** 
(0.0565) 
cohort_1997 -1.7086*** (0.4145) 
-0.6051*** 
(0.1090) 
cohort_1998 -1.5019*** (0.4326) 
-0.5473*** 
(0.1303) 
cohort_1999 -1.6412*** (0.4306) 
-0.5876*** 
(0.1199) 
cohort_2000 -1.7047*** (0.4314) 
-0.6046*** 
(0.1147) 
cohort_2001 -1.7220*** (0.4314) 
-0.6091*** 
(0.1132) 
cohort_2002 -1.8035*** (0.4326) 
-0.6252*** 
(0.1017) 
prior_enlisted -1.9582*** (0.4391) 
-0.6500*** 
(0.0838) 
prior_officer 0.1425 (0.1933) 
0.0481 
(0.0630) 
Biological Studies -0.0157 (0.0693) 
-0.0055 
(0.0242) 




Physical_Science -0.0626 (0.1374) 
-0.0222 
(0.0493) 
Psychology -0.3602* (0.1900) 
-0.1347* 
(0.0746) 
Social_Science 0.0663 (0.2468) 
0.0227 
(0.0831) 
Non_SCI 0.0143 (0.1085) 
0.0050 
(0.0376) 
married 0.0174 (0.0830) 
0.0061 
(0.0288) 
divorced -0.1379 (0.2786) 
-0.0497 
(0.1033) 
New_England -0.0594 (0.1436) 
-0.0210 
(0.0514) 
Mid_Atlantic -0.0639 (0.0966) 
-0.0226 
(0.0344) 
Mid_West -0.0297 (0.0895) 
-0.0104 
(0.0315) 
South_West 0.0300 (0.1476) 
0.0104 
(0.0507) 
West -0.0516 (0.0974) 
-0.0182 
(0.0346) 
unknown_state -0.0900 (0.0924) 
-0.0318 
(0.0331) 
Gen_surgery -0.1231 (0.2046) 
-0.0442 
(0.0753) 
OTHER_SPECIALTY -0.1103 (0.1812) 
-0.0395 
(0.0663) 
GPA -0.0004 (0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0001) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX B. MINORITY MODEL RESULTS 
Minority Model – Regression Results 
Variables (1) Probit Results 
(2) 
Marginal Effects 
USUHS 1.2865*** (0.3666) 
0.4055*** 
(0.0710) 
NADDS -1.3348*** (0.2347) 
-0.4810*** 
(0.0658) 
NADDS_1_YR -0.8762*** (0.2506) 
-0.3272*** 
(0.0798) 
FAP -0.3610 (0.2814) 
-0.1430 
(0.1092) 
OTHER 0.2189 (0.3135) 
0.0856 
(0.1199) 
female -0.0723 (0.1637) 
-0.0288 
(0.0651) 
Asian 0.8556*** (0.2306) 
0.3258*** 
(0.0818) 
Black 1.0652*** (0.2249) 
0.3887*** 
(0.0715) 
cohort_1997 5.5132 (184.9943) 
0.8702*** 
(0.0199) 
cohort_1998 -0.0682 (0.2845) 
-0.0272 
(0.1133) 
cohort_1999 0.3428 (0.3110) 
0.1330 
(0.1163) 
cohort_2000 0.0344 (0.3036) 
0.0136 
(0.1203) 
cohort_2001 0.0021 (0.3208) 
0.0008 
(0.1274) 
cohort_2002 0.6668** (0.3172) 
0.2471** 
(0.1042) 
prior_officer -5.5424 (184.9943) 
-0.8974*** 
(0.0137) 
Biological_Studies -0.1817 (0.1929) 
-0.0722 
(0.0766) 
Engineering -0.2829 (0.4646) 
-0.1124 
(0.1823) 
Physical_Science -0.0344 (0.3353) 
-0.0137 
(0.1335) 




Social_Science 0.1736 (0.5386) 
0.0681 
(0.2079) 
Non_SCI -0.1572 (0.2923) 
-0.0626 
(0.1164) 
married 0.2881 (0.2164) 
0.1132 
(0.0836) 
divorced 0.5705 (0.5957) 
0.2103 
(0.1931) 
New_England 0.0309 (0.3403) 
0.0123 
(0.1348) 
Mid_Atlantic -0.0455 (0.2539) 
-0.0181 
(0.1011) 
Mid_West -0.2573 (0.2411) 
-0.1024 
(0.0955) 
South_West 0.3752 (0.4553) 
0.1438 
(0.1646) 
West 0.0284 (0.2672) 
0.0113 
(0.1059) 
unknown_state -0.3316 (0.2292) 
-0.1317 
(0.0901) 
Gen_surgery 0.0524 (0.4334) 
0.0208 
(0.1712) 
OTHER_SPECIALTY -0.0620 (0.3818) 
-0.0247 
(0.1522) 
GPA 0.0013* (0.0007) 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C. GENDER MODEL RESULTS 
Females Only – Regression Results 
Variables (1) Probit Results 
(2) 
Marginal Effects 
USUHS 1.0072*** (0.2673) 
0.2873*** 
(0.0499) 
NADDS -1.3944*** (0.1622) 
-0.5138*** 
(0.0496) 
NADDS_1_YR -0.9982*** (0.1897) 
-0.3823*** 
(0.0668) 
FAP -0.6112** (0.2556) 
-0.2381** 
(0.1000) 
OTHER -0.0359 (0.2969) 
-0.0132 
(0.1104) 
Asian -0.2032 (0.2403) 
-0.0769 
(0.0932) 
Black -0.0759 (0.1924) 
-0.0282 
(0.0722) 
other_race -1.1587*** (0.3206) 
-0.4354*** 
(0.1017) 
cohort_1997 -0.6352** (0.2538) 
-0.2451** 
(0.0986) 
cohort_1998 -0.1909 (0.2422) 
-0.0717 
(0.0929) 
cohort_1999 -0.4426* (0.2456) 
-0.1699* 
(0.0965) 
cohort_2000 -0.3771 (0.2435) 
-0.1439 
(0.0952) 
cohort_2001 -0.4742** (0.2384) 
-0.1818* 
(0.0933) 
cohort_2002 -0.0523 (0.2484) 
-0.0193 
(0.0925) 
prior_officer 0.3665 (0.3803) 
0.1233 
(0.1146) 
Biological_Studies -0.0416 (0.1348) 
-0.0153 
(0.0496) 
Engineering 0.0912 (0.3527) 
0.0328 
(0.1244) 




Psychology -0.2070 (0.3898) 
-0.0786 
(0.1520) 
Social_Science 0.2246 (0.4912) 
0.0782 
(0.1609) 
Non_SCI -0.0868 (0.2131) 
-0.0323 
(0.0802) 
married 0.0369 (0.1589) 
0.0135 
(0.0578) 
divorced 0.1721 (0.5838) 
0.0607 
(0.1971) 
New_England 0.4400 (0.2963) 
0.1449* 
(0.0849) 
Mid_Atlantic 0.0875 (0.1825) 
0.0317 
(0.0652) 
Mid_West 0.1743 (0.1742) 
0.0624 
(0.0607) 
South_West 0.2348 (0.2704) 
0.0819 
(0.0890) 
West 0.1604 (0.1892) 
0.0574 
(0.0658) 
unknown_state 0.0928 (0.1827) 
0.0336 
(0.0652) 
Gen_surgery -0.6866 (0.4700) 
-0.2678 
(0.1808) 
OTHER_SPECIALTY 0.6190 (0.4637) 
0.1909* 
(0.1120) 
GPA -0.0010 (0.0006) 
-0.0004 
(0.0002) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX D. GENDER MODEL RESULTS 
Males Only – Regression Results 
Variables (1) Probit Results 
(2) 
Marginal Effects 
USUHS 1.1597*** (0.1439) 
0.2896*** 
(0.0207) 
NADDS -1.3082*** (0.0852) 
-0.4862*** 
(0.0282) 
NADDS_1_YR -0.7705*** (0.1043) 
-0.2950*** 
(0.0404) 
FAP -0.7337*** (0.1116) 
-0.2811*** 
(0.0435) 
OTHER 0.2158* (0.1240) 
0.0712* 
(0.0385) 
Asian -0.0020 (0.1163) 
-0.0007 
(0.0406) 
Black 0.0801 (0.1268) 
0.0274 
(0.0425) 
other_race -0.8341*** (0.1475) 
-0.3201*** 
(0.0564) 
cohort_1997 -1.6961*** (0.4142) 
-0.6019*** 
(0.1099) 
cohort_1998 -1.4917*** (0.4324) 
-0.5442*** 
(0.1310) 
cohort_1999 -1.6325*** (0.4305) 
-0.5852*** 
(0.1205) 
cohort_2000 -1.6944*** (0.4312) 
-0.6019*** 
(0.1155) 
cohort_2001 -1.7097*** (0.4311) 
-0.6058*** 
(0.1141) 
cohort_2002 -1.7905*** (0.4323) 
-0.6222*** 
(0.1027) 
prior_enlisted -1.9425*** (0.4387) 
-0.6471*** 
(0.0850) 
prior_officer 0.1385 (0.1931) 
0.0468 
(0.0631) 
Biological_Studies -0.0135 (0.0692) 
-0.0047 
(0.0242) 




Physical_Science -0.0629 (0.1373) 
-0.0223 
(0.0493) 
Psychology -0.3602* (0.1899) 
-0.1347* 
(0.0745) 
Social_Science 0.0663 (0.2465) 
0.0227 
(0.0830) 
Non_SCI 0.0147 (0.1085) 
0.0051 
(0.0376) 
divorced -0.1384 (0.2788) 
-0.0499 
(0.1034) 
married 0.0208 (0.0829) 
0.0072 
(0.0287) 
New_England -0.0616 (0.1436) 
-0.0218 
(0.0515) 
Mid_Atlantic -0.0644 (0.0965) 
-0.0227 
(0.0344) 
Mid_West -0.0322 (0.0895) 
-0.0113 
(0.0315) 
South_West 0.0300 (0.1476) 
0.0104 
(0.0507) 
West -0.0547 (0.0973) 
-0.0193 
(0.0346) 
unknown_state -0.0925 (0.0923) 
-0.0327 
(0.0331) 
Gen_surgery -0.1270 (0.2046) 
-0.0456 
(0.0754) 
OTHER_SPECIALTY -0.1176 (0.1809) 
-0.0421 
(0.0664) 
GPA -0.0004 (0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0001) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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APPENDIX E. NADDS CONTINUATION TABLE 
 
Probability 1 0.99 0.96 0.72 0.36 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0 0.04 0.04
Fiscal Year Number Accessed
1996 23 23 23 22 17 8 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1997 52 52 51 50 37 19 9 8 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
1998 62 62 61 60 45 22 11 9 7 6 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
1999 68 68 67 65 49 24 12 10 8 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2000 82 82 81 79 59 30 15 12 10 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
2001 61 61 60 59 44 22 11 9 7 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
2002 47 47 47 45 34 17 8 7 6 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2003 24 24 24 23 17 9 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2004 21 21 21 20 15 8 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2005 20 20 20 19 14 7 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2006 32 32 32 31 23 12 6 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
2007 26 26 26 25 19 9 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2008 43 43 43 41 31 15 8 6 5 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2009 57 57 56 55 41 21 10 9 7 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
2010 67 67 66 64 48 24 12 10 8 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Years of Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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APPENDIX F. NADDS 1-YEAR DELAY CONTINUATION TABLE 
 
Probability o 1 0.99 0.96 0.71 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07
Fiscal Year Number Accessed
1996 28 28 28 27 20 13 11 10 9 7 6 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
1997 19 19 19 18 13 9 7 6 6 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
1998 30 30 30 29 21 14 12 10 9 8 7 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
1999 43 43 43 41 31 20 17 15 13 11 9 8 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3
2000 24 24 24 23 17 11 9 8 7 6 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
2001 12 12 12 12 9 6 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2002 26 26 26 25 18 12 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
2003 23 23 23 22 16 11 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
2004 27 27 27 26 19 12 11 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
2005 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006 20 20 20 19 14 9 8 7 6 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
2007 13 13 13 12 9 6 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2008 6 6 6 6 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
2009 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Years of Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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APPENDIX G. FAP CONTINUATION TABLE 
 
Probability 1 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.58 0.42 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
Fiscal Year Number Accessed
1996 18 18 18 17 15 10 8 6 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0
1997 13 13 13 12 11 8 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1998 17 17 17 16 14 10 7 5 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0
1999 19 19 19 18 16 11 8 6 6 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0
2000 32 32 32 30 27 19 13 10 9 8 6 5 4 4 3 3 2 1 0 0 0
2001 34 34 34 32 28 20 14 11 10 8 6 5 5 4 3 3 2 1 0 0 0
2002 23 23 23 22 19 13 10 7 7 6 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 0
2003 19 19 19 18 16 11 8 6 6 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0
2004 27 27 27 26 22 16 11 9 8 6 5 4 4 4 2 2 1 1 0 0 0
2005 11 11 11 10 9 6 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
2006 10 10 10 10 8 6 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
2007 9 9 9 9 7 5 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2008 14 14 14 13 12 8 6 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
2009 7 7 7 7 6 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2010 17 17 17 16 14 10 7 5 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0
Years of Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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APPENDIX H. OTHER CONTINUATION TABLE 
 
Probability 1 0.99 0.9 0.73 0.6 0.53 0.46 0.39 0.37 0.3 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.12
Fiscal Year Number Accessed
1996 21 21 21 19 15 13 11 10 8 8 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3
1997 31 31 31 28 23 19 16 14 12 11 9 9 8 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 4
1998 28 28 28 25 20 17 15 13 11 10 8 8 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 3
1999 22 22 22 20 16 13 12 10 9 8 7 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3
2000 13 13 13 12 9 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
2001 34 34 34 31 25 20 18 16 13 13 10 10 9 7 8 7 6 6 6 5 4
2002 15 15 15 14 11 9 8 7 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
2003 10 10 10 9 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
2004 12 12 12 11 9 7 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1
2005 14 14 14 13 10 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
2006 14 14 14 13 10 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
2007 8 8 8 7 6 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
2008 13 13 13 12 9 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
2009 17 17 17 15 12 10 9 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2
2010 22 22 22 20 16 13 12 10 9 8 7 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3
Years of Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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